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BOOK REVIEW  
 
A Break Away From the Deleuzian Mainstream? A review of: 
John Protevi, Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences (Minnesota: Minnesota University 
Press, 2013), Pagination, Price, ISBN: 978-0-8166-8102-0. 
 
Protevi’s most recent work has been mostly a cause for joy, for despite its being loosely stapled 
from a collection of previous articles, it achieves a degree of seriousness and insight that sets it 
apart from the rabble of “Deleuzian” secondary literature. The dominant theme running through 
the entire book is a concern for the development of subjectivities in the context of the cognitive, 
neurological, and biological sciences. While the first part can be seen as a continuation of the pro-
ject of Political Affect (his previous book), the second part brings the insights of the first to an ad-
mirable conclusion that gives the book its unique status. The third part is born of an entirely dif-
ferent line of thought, engaged as it is with panpsychism and the philosophy of biology. The two 
introductions attempt to acquaint the reader with some of the issues that the book will address, 
while also explaining the relation between Deleuze and certain branches of science, such as De-
velopmental Systems Theory and cognitive science. Despite the effort, the book suffers a lack of 
any in-depth insight about why these specific sciences fit in with Deleuze’s philosophy or the lat-
ter’s attitude toward science. 
The first part, entitled “Geophilosophy: Earth and War,” is thematically linked by the 
analysis of warfare, and methodologically linked by Protevi’s characteristic analysis of the sub-, 
supra, and adjunct-subjective in their various configurations and connections. 
The first chapter sets out to study ancient warfare in terms of sub- and adjunct-subjective 
politics of energy (hydraulic, solar, etc.), preservation, and consumption. It also contains discus-
sions of the works of Margulis, the concept of Hypersea, the portable water carrier of nomads that 
allowed their deterritorialization, among other issues. The main issue, however, is how the supra-
subjective geopolitical factors combine with adjunct-subjective factors; i.e. technical substrate in 
the emergence of States, their politics, and warfare. Examples include the irrigation practices in 
ancient Egypt (according to Butzer) and the link between Athenian warfare (the hoplite reform 
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and the democratic rowers of the triremes) and its import of grain and export of olive oil (these 
are defined as biologically preserved solar-power).  
Unlike the previous chapter, in chapter 2 the focus is on modern warfare and practices of 
de-subjectification, which will provide a way for the direct coupling of the sub-subjective neuro-
physiological or the somatic level and the supra-subjective, socio-political level without the 
awareness or intervention of the subject. The issue is broached in terms of the act of killing at 
close range, and the rage necessary to do it; rage here acts as a trigger for evacuation of the con-
scious subject, handing agency over to “affect programs” (63). Thus the perfect soldier is the de-
subjectified soldier. The supra-subjective military assemblages (e.g. real-time networked teams of 
soldiers) are directly linked to the desubjectified soldier’s sub-subjective, somatic level. This chap-
ter proves important to the general focus of the book by demonstrating the ways in which desub-
jectification can be put to use by the apparatuses of control. 
In a relatively lengthy third chapter (“Music and Ancient Warfare”), Protevi engages in a 
sustained and well-formed exegesis of the notion of affect in the works of Deleuze and Guattari 
and then proceeds to give an account of the neurological workings of affect (as opposed to “feel-
ing” or “emotion”), focusing specifically on rage. By describing the neuro-biological aspects of 
rage in reference to the work of Panksepp, Protevi lays the ground for a historical study of rage 
(as an exemplary affect), set in ca. 1200 B.C.E. when the berserker “hill-runners” destroyed most 
of Bronze Age civilizations (71). He further reveals how rhythm and dance can affect the warrior 
and trigger a non-cortical rage circuit, throwing the warrior into a frenzy. The use of Develop-
mental Systems Theory, in an effort to avoid reducing the complex interplay of triggers and de-
termining factors of behavior, is another remarkable feature of this chapter. 
The heart of Earth, Life, War, the second part of this book, comprises some of the most im-
portant ideas and analyses of the whole book. While it does not attempt to explain why the cogni-
tive sciences, especially the 4EA or “embodied mind” branch, can be considered a Deleuzian sci-
ence or rather why there is a strong resonance between the philosophy of the latter with the con-
cepts and workings of the former, “Cognitive Science: Brain and Body” does broach some issues 
that are ground-breaking in certain aspects, even if their radical nature is not made explicit. Be-
cause of the numerous chapters involved in this part and the relative importance of chapter six 
(one of the only two chapters written specifically for this book), I am going to present only the 
more important chapters.  
In chapter 4, which focuses mostly on Wexler, Protevi introduces his concern for a neglect-
ed temporal scale of analysis in the processes of individuation in the cognitive sciences, thus tak-
ing the first move towards posing the granularity problem. Between the evolutionary time scale, 
used to analyze a people, and the behavioral time scale of a single person, Protevi places the tem-
poral scale of development of a group subjectivity. A brief remark on his mention of the works of 
Rodney Brooks in AI is also necessary: I believe that an extended discussion of Brooks’ ideas 
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about “intelligence without representation” would have been very suitable, seeing how it fits in 
perfectly with Deleuze’s non-representational, affective philosophy—affect being defined as 
thought without representation. 
Forming the core argument of the book, chapters 5 and 6 deal with “the Political Economy 
of Consciousness,” i.e. the relation between the body politic and (de)subjectification practices. The 
first chapter investigates acts of desubjectification aimed at rendering the conscious judgment of 
the subject obsolete so that a direct socio-somatic link can be established. His examples include 
rational choice theory as well as the positively evaluated events at Occupy Wall Street, especially 
the “human microphone” technique. In his discussion of rational choice theory, he brings out the 
“dark side” of desubjectification when he shows how people can be made predictable (of course 
at least since von Neumann we know that predictable really means efficient), replaced with black 
boxes of cybernetics. As we shall see, what Protevi refuses to realize is the fact that the cognitive 
sciences are not merely studying “political economy zombies” (113) or other desubjectification 
practices: they help produce the said “zombies.” Protevi’s respect for some branches of cognitive 
science renders him unable to see the non-innocence of behavioral, neurological, and cognitive 
sciences which produce the I/O protocol of the human-turned-black-box for the societies of con-
trol. 
Chapter 6, “the Granularity Problem,” is what sets this book apart from most of secondary 
literature on Deleuze; the Deleuzian rabble. Here Protevi reaches into the heart of the question he 
has been broaching slowly throughout the previous chapters (and even in his Political Affect) by 
delimiting a mid-level scale of analysis, corresponding to the developmental time-scale, dealing 
with group subjectivities wherein “politics” can truly be defined (this is where he comes close to 
some of Arendt’s notions). By abandoning the sub-subjective as well as the supra-subjective, 
Protevi chooses to study the development of multiple subjectivities in their individuation pro-
cesses. It is at this level, at the level of the subject proper, that Protevi places the possibility of a 
politics, and by doing so he essentially, although quietly, breaks away from some of the tenets of 
Deleuze’s philosophy. After illustrating the evils of the sub-subjective, Protevi comes to appreci-
ate the subjective in its environmental-social development as a conscious, choice-making, political 
subject with attributes of race and gender that must be thematized as “politically important cate-
gories” (130). He expresses the importance of the judging human subject in the political arena by 
moving away from sub-subjective occurrences which are in the end nothing but acts of subjective 
evacuation or the “crowding out” of subjectivity which disempowers and removes human beings 
from the political sphere. 
However, Protevi refuses to acknowledge the implications of his own analyses, for despite 
proving it clearly through examples, he does not admit the far-from-innocent status of these sci-
ences in relation to the formation of control dispositifs; rather, he sees both cognitive science (and 
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Deleuze’s philosophy, by extension) as what allow us to perceive the wrongs inflicted on us by 
the State.  
Be that as it may, Protevi enables a new critique of Deleuze’s philosophy, which is in need 
of a reappraisal given its passion for the desubjectified and its sub-subjective policies. As Badiou 
says, “[the] ‘purified automaton’ is certainly much closer to the Deleuzian norm than were the 
bearded militants of 1968, bearing the standard of their gross desire.”1  
The third part of the book is thematically detached from the preceding parts, sharing nei-
ther in their concern nor scope of analysis. Focused on the developmental in biology (the “eco-
dev-evo” approach) and the relation between autopoiesis, cognition, and life in general in the 
context of panpsychism, the chapters comprised in this part are more suitable for an expert audi-
ence engaged in the philosophy of biology, a fact reinforced by a lack of definitions for key terms, 
and lack of explication of elaborate or novel concepts. The discussion of notions of subjectivity 
and cognitive science are abruptly abandoned with the thematic change in this part. 
The eighth chapter departs on a study of minimal subjectivity or mind in lower life-forms 
such as the E. coli bacteria. While this chapter’s look into a Deleuzian panpsychism stays within 
the limits of the biological, i.e. the living, the next chapter takes things further by considering 
prebiotic “minds.” Introducing the notions of passive and organic synthesis and “larval subjects” 
from Deleuze’s oeuvre, and autopoiesis, adaptability, and sense-making from the enactive branch 
of cognitive science, Protevi engages in a thoughtful analysis of “organic time” and “organic sub-
jectivity” in cellular organisms, paving the way for the next chapter. 
Chapter nine, entitled “Mind in Life, Mind in Process,” takes its title from a recent book by 
Evan Thompson (Mind in Life) discussing whether mind, or cognition, is co-extensive with life, 
defined minimally as autopoietic systems. Taking his cue from some aspects of Deleuze’s philos-
ophy, Protevi opts for a panpsychism that goes even beyond living organisms by attributing 
“mind” or the status of larval subjects to all “processes” which in some way or another entail indi-
viduation or information-processing—“even rocks.” (195) The philosophical grounds of this chap-
ter are laid on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and his notion of passive synthesis, which, ap-
plied to the organism at the cellular level, reveals the decisive role of the membrane in the synthe-
sis of a living present as well as differentiating between the inside and the outside. Simondon’s 
works and Deleuze’s adaptation of them are also discussed. The chapter ends with reflections on 
Bateson’s concept of “cybernetic mind” and whether it could lay the foundation of a panpsychism 
embracing prebiotic processes. 
Described by Protevi as the “most ambitious” (197) part of the whole book, chapter 10 is 
the only other chapter beside the sixth that has been explicitly written for this book. It involves 
bringing Deleuze’s ontology to bear on the work of West-Eberhard on Developmental Plasticity and 
                                                 
1 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: the Clamor of Being (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2000), 11. 
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Evolution by showing how biology’s recent rejection of the genetic as sole determining factor of 
development in favor of “an interlocking system of genetic and epigenetic factors” opens the way 
for understanding and accepting Deleuze’s concept of a differentiated virtual multiplicity. The 
chapter also serves to clarify and explain Protevi’s interest in the developmental aspect of analysis 
and his celebration of what he terms the “eco-dev-evo” approach (one that takes evolution and 
the hereditary determinations to be subservient and secondary to developmental, and perhaps 
ecological, factors). Protevi also explains how West-Eberhard’s “developmental plasticity” can be 
more or less equated with the “priority of individuation” in Deleuze, further arguing that the 
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